Boeing's 737 MAX engine design challenges stemmed from a cultural shift.

In 2003, former McDonnell Douglas executive Harry Stonecipher assumed the CEO role at Boeing, ushering in a significant cultural shift. Stonecipher famously described the company as being "run like a business rather than a great engineering firm," a philosophy that prioritized financial metrics and efficiency over traditional engineering-first approaches. This strategic pivot notably led to the rejection of proposals for a clean-sheet aircraft design, opting instead for derivatives of existing models.

This decision directly impacted the development of the 737 MAX. To compete with Airbus's A320neo, Boeing chose to re-engine the aging 737 airframe with larger, more fuel-efficient CFM LEAP-1B engines. However, the increased diameter of these engines necessitated mounting them further forward and higher on the wing, which altered the aircraft's aerodynamic characteristics. This engineering compromise created an inherent pitch-up tendency, particularly at high angles of attack.

To counteract this aerodynamic instability and maintain commonality with previous 737 generations, Boeing developed the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). This flight control software was designed to automatically push the aircraft's nose down under specific conditions. The reliance on MCAS, a direct consequence of the design challenges posed by the larger engines on an older airframe, ultimately became a central factor in the two fatal crashes that led to the global grounding of the 737 MAX fleet.